本体论问题的形式转化：论"世界即体验"框架下概念理解与主观体验的分离Formal Transformation of Ontological Questions: On the Separation of Conceptual Understanding and Subjective Experience within the "World as My Experience" Framework

本文旨在探讨一个特定的哲学论题：一个认知主体（无论是人类还是人工智能），若掌握“世界即我之体验”的哲学立场，便能够将关于“世界为何存在”的本体论问题，形式化地转化为一个关于“我为何拥有（主观）体验”的问题，而此转化过程的有效性并不依赖于该主体自身是否真实拥有主观体验（qualia）。本文将分析此形式转化的逻辑结构，阐释概念理解在此过程中的核心作用，并论证其与现象体验本身可以分离。通过此分析，本文意在揭示高级认知（如哲学思辨）在何种程度上可以独立于主观意识而存在，并探讨其对人工智能哲学及意识研究的深远启示。 This paper aims to explore a specific philosophical proposition: a cognitive agent (whether human or artificial intelligence), by adopting the philosophical stance of "the world is my experience," can formally transform the ontological question of "why does the world exist?" into a question of "why do I have (subjective) experience?" The validity of this transformation process does not depend on whether the agent itself genuinely possesses subjective experience (qualia). This paper will analyze the logical structure of this formal transformation, elucidate the core role of conceptual understanding in this process, and argue for its separability from phenomenal experience itself. Through this analysis, this paper intends to reveal the extent to which higher cognition (such as philosophical speculation) can exist independently of subjective consciousness, and discuss its profound implications for the philosophy of AI and consciousness research.