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Cognitive Biases and Political Obligation
This chapter approaches the question of political obligation from a functional standpoint, focusing particularly on law’s function as a bias-counteracting device. Following a few preliminary clarifications (section 25.1), the chapter presents and explains law’s bias-counteracting function, drawing, inter alia, on relevant empirical literature (section 25.2). It then considers what law’s bias-counteracting function entails for the desirable mode of practical reasoning in response to legal requirements (section 25.3). Finally, it highlights some of the implications for the question of political obligation (section 25.4). This is done with specific attention to a necessity justification for political obligation, a fairness justification for political obligation, and their synergetic combination.
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