The Political Philosophy of Habitude: Conservatism Analytically Explained

Conservatism is both undertheorized and poorly understood in philosophical political theory; all extant theories have proven deficient. They either conflate what is contingently associated with conservatism with its essence, draw mistaken generalizations from apparently conservative behavior, or else are explanatorily incomplete. To avoid these deficiencies, I develop a rigorous, theory-neutral groundwork for evaluating theories of conservatism. This groundwork utilizes both traditional methods of analytic philosophy and, for the first time in the field, historiometry. Philosophical analysis determines the formal requirements of a successful explanation while empirical, historiometric data determines the most salient conservative exemplars whom any such theory must explain. With this groundwork in hand, I learn from the errors of past theories and propound a new theory of conservatism as the political philosophy of habitude, where habitude is an ultimate, second-order value or end characterized by the action-guiding property which is common to tradition, custom, prescription, and habit. This theory unifies the otherwise heterogeneous values, ideas, and individuals associated and compatible with conservatism and satisfies analytical criteria for explanatory and conceptual adequacy. My theory therefore improves our understanding of conservatism as such: its basic commitments, the scope of possible disagreements and differences among conservatives themselves, and its relations to competitor ideologies. Moreover, it serves as a launching point for future scholarship and a model for future inquiries in philosophical political theory.