The Dialectical Ethics of Practical or Functional Philosophy: From Aristotle to Basil-Juléat Fouda and Back

The aim of this article is to show that self-improvement is a modality of all dialectical ethics, which takes place in every hermeneutic situation where the subject confronts practical knowledge in order to decide on his or her action. From Aristotle to Basil-Juléat Fouda, ethical knowledge only makes sense in an intersubjective understanding of the world. From this unipolarity emerges the common ground of a philosophical foundation for ethics, namely from phrónèsis, which has the particularity of being practical knowledge, mobilising practical reason, and which is distinct from the theoretical knowledge of epistêmê. However, this disposition, which expresses itself in African knowledge-wisdom and guides its practical conduct, finds its consolidation in its relationship with transcendence. Thus, beyond the comparatism that establishes the identity between practical philosophy (Aristotle) and functional philosophy (Fouda), we realise that there is an African added value in terms of the foundations of ethical action.