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Reinterpreting Nash Equilibrium and Game Theory: From Prisoners to Fluctuations
Nash equilibrium is traditionally defined as a stable outcome where no player has an incentive to deviate. However, such stability assumes a purely rational agent and neglects the diversity of human nature: some act under the presumption of goodness, others under self-interest. This paper reinterprets Nash equilibrium and game theory through the lens of fluctuation philosophy and time quanta, treating equilibrium not as a fixed point but as a transient correlation structure.
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