In what sense is evolution blind to moral truth?

According to evolutionary debunking arguments against moral realism, evolution is blind to whether moral judgments are objectively true or false, and this means that our moral beliefs are epistemically defective given realism. But in what sense is evolution blind to moral truth, and why is this epistemically significant? This question has two standard answers, the modalist answer and the explanationist answer. Both answers face difficulties. I present an alternative: the telic answer. According to the telic answer, evolution is blind to moral truth in the sense that it is alethically indifferent to moral beliefs – that is, the truth or falsity of moral beliefs makes no causal difference to the course of evolution (even if moral facts do). This is epistemically significant because it implies, when conjoined with an etiological account of natural functions, that grasping moral truth is not the function of moral cognition. I argue that the telic answer is both independent of and dialectically more promising than the modalist and explanationist answers. I then develop a full-fledged telic debunking argument against moral realism and defend it against objections. I conclude by noting some implications of my arguments for domains beyond metaethics.