Black Holes as a Boundary Case for Emergence - An MNO-based Clarification of the Ontological Boundary of Physical World-Capability

Black holes are regarded as paradigmatic boundary objects of modern physics. They simultaneously mark limits of empirical accessibility, theoretical inconsistencies, and metaphysical projection surfaces. In popular as well as speculative discourses, they are frequently interpreted as manifestations of a “nothing,” as cosmic singularities, or even as sources of emergent order. This paper advances a deliberately countervailing thesis: black holes are not a case of application of emergence, but an extreme case of its failure. On the basis of the MNO model (Minimal-Non-Object), which understands emergence not as an effect of energy or complexity but as the structural capacity to return into world-capable relation, black holes are analyzed as maximally indimergent systems. Their physical characteristics—event horizon, information paradox, observer-dependence, and the absence of reconstructable interior spaces—can be read consistently as expressions of a fully collapsed world-capability, without introducing new physical postulates. The contribution does not aim to replace or extend existing astrophysical theories. Instead, it shows that the MNO model enables a conceptual clarification by strictly distinguishing physical conservation, informational coding, and relational accessibility. On this basis, black holes appear not as gateways to an ontological “nothing,” but as boundary markers at which emergence, perspective, and recursive opening come to an end. In this way, black holes function within this approach as a negative foil for theories of emergence: they sharpen the concept of emergence itself by showing under which structural conditions world-formation is no longer possible.