La concepción arendtiana del juicio: Pluralidad y ‘mentalidad ampliada’ en la construcción de una ciudadanía democrática

The Arendtian conception of judgment is centered on the notion of an ‘enlarged mentality’. Based on this idea the author explains that the exercise of our faculty of judgment demands that we incorporate the others’ views into our own, that is, that ‘we train ourselves in visiting the others’ perspec-tives’. Likewise, Arendt repeatedly points out that the faculty of judgment is, perhaps, the most political of the human mental activities and, even, the po-litical faculty par excellence. Its political relevance arises, at least in part, from the fact that it implies a mode of thinking the human affairs that incorporates the human plurality. In the present article we critically examine the Arendtian notion of an ‘enlarged mentality’, by specifically posing the question of how to understand this claim that judging demands when we take human plurality into account.