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Hume on the Best Attested Miracles
Hume lists various criteria of testimonial strength and claims that no miracle story meets those criteria enough to be credible. He goes on to describe various miracle stories as meeting the criteria to an exceptionally high degree, but even so, asserts that we can dismiss the stories. The background assumption is that his readers won’t be tempted to believe these stories. He thinks these Catholic and pagan miracles are better attested than the miracle stories in the Bible, and if we shouldn’t believe in the better attested stories, then we shouldn’t believe in the worse. Hume has a good point: people who believe in one miracle but not another because of the traditions in which they’ve been raised may find it epistemically useful to compare the evidence for these miracles
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