On the Irreversible Order of Perceptions in Kant's Second Analogy of Experience

In the Second Analogy of Experience, Kant discusses that the concept of causality is necessary for the experience of an objective succession (a succession of states where state A is followed by state B), where the experience is a cognition that consists of judgment and perception. The perception that corresponds to the cognition of objective succession, for Kant, is an irreversible order of perceptions where the perception of state A (Ap) is necessarily followed by the perception of state B (Bp). But what role does the concept of causality play in determining this irreversible order of perceptions? James Hutton thinks that the concept of causality determines this irreversible order of perceptions through its logical form. The logical form of the concept of causality is a hypothetical conditional of the form ‘if X (cause), then objective succession obtains’. For this reason, when one judges that X obtains, one is inferentially necessitated to judge that AB obtains and to place Ap prior to Bp. I reject his proposal via two objections: 1) Hutton fails to establish that one must have any perceptions at all, and 2) even if one has perceptions, the order of perceptions that result from his account is contingent.