Time Cannot Compose: Why Externalist Theories of Temporality Fail Their Own Standards

Externalist theories of time claim that temporal properties exist independently of experience. This paper demonstrates that such theories fail by their own compositional standards. Materialism requires that all properties either be fundamental physical properties or compose from them. However, temporal properties (before/after relations, directedness, duration) cannot be built from non-temporal physical properties without presupposing the temporal structure being explained. This composition failure is not merely empirical but logical. Additionally, standard definitions of time as "change in physical states" involve circular reasoning, as change itself presupposes temporal ordering. After demonstrating these failures, I show that experiential temporality, understood as limitation structure intrinsic to experience, provides a more coherent and epistemically grounded alternative. The apparent objectivity of time stems from shared experiential regularities and coordinating mechanisms, not from accessing external temporal dimensions.