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Waiting for Trade in Markets with Aggregate Uncertainty
This paper studies learning in markets with aggregate uncertainty about whether trade is efficient. A long-lived seller offers prices to buyers, who are short-lived and arrive according to a Poisson process. A hidden state determines whether the buyers' common value exceeds the seller's reservation
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