Free Will, Abilities, and the Grain of Explanation

“General Abilities Compatibilism” (GAC) says that the ability to do otherwise relevant for free will is a mere general ability. It thus explains how free will is compatible with determinism: Nobody believes that an agent who is lawfully determined to not raise her hand thereby lacks the general ability (or capacity) to raise her hand. At the same time, GAC faces the charge of changing the subject. General abilities to do otherwise are compatible with determinism because they ignore circumstantial detail. But why are these general abilities pertinent for free will? Why not specific abilities that consider the complete circumstances? In this paper, I develop GAC in terms of how general abilities explain the freedom (or unfreedom) of actions. We know from the philosophy of science that we often prefer abstract explanations that ignore circumstantial detail. I use this insight to motivate GAC and respond to the above challenge.