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Tempting the Agent: The Economics of Reputation without Persistent Identity in AI Agent Markets
Reputation is a fundamental mechanism through which markets sustain trust when service quality cannot be perfectly assessed ex ante, constituting a form of intertemporal economic capital by attracting future demand. Its effectiveness as a disciplinary mechanism depends not only on past interactions
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