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Basic Goods and Basic Income in the New Natural Law Theory

Morozov, Konstantin · 2025
PhilArchive · Papers · 2025
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philosophy
Do people have any natural welfare rights? This article examines this question from the perspective of the most influential contemporary natural rights concept, the new natural law theory. This theory was developed by John Finnis, Germaine Grisez, and Joseph Boyle in the second half of the 20th century and remains an influential position in moral, legal and political philosophy. The first section of this article describes the general theoretical foundations of the new natural law theory: basic goods and basic principles of practical rationality. According to the new natural law, natural human rights are normatively protected interests in the realization of basic goods, the normative protection of which is provided by a pluralistic concept of practical rationality. The following sections consider how this general description justifies giving all people natural welfare rights and institutionalizing these rights in the form of a basic income. The second section is devoted to the natural law concept of property, which includes a left-libertarianesque equal right to common resources. The third section is devoted to the formulation of a more practice-oriented natural right of property, which is based on a strict requirement of moral autonomy or self-constitution. It is demonstrated how this right simultaneously justifies both limited property rights and redistribution to guarantee everyone the minimum resources for moral autonomy. However, this same claim to autonomy limits the forms of provision of this minimal share of resources to a basic income, since it protects the broadest opportunities to independently dispose of one’s share of resources, using them in various self-constitutive projects. The conclusion concludes sums up that the new natural law allows for various forms of institutionalization of basic income, but justifies a strong presumption in favor of its unconditional provision.
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