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A characterization of the von Neumann and Morgenstern stable set in matching markets
This paper studies the structure and computation of von Neumann-Morgenstern (vNM) stable sets in one-to-one matching markets. While pairwise stability and corewise stability coincide under strict preferences and provide a well-understood benchmark, vNM stability is defined through dominance relation
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