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Tournaments with Managerial Discretion
We study tournaments with managerial discretion in hiring. A manager selects a coworker from a pool of candidates and then competes against him in a Lazear--Rosen--style tournament with a prize equal to a share of total output. A profit-maximizing principal sets the prize share together with a head
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