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Multi-Principal Competition for an Exclusive Agent: characterization and approximation of Nash Equilibria
This paper introduces and studies a Principal-Agent competition model where two risk-neutral Principals compete to hire a single Agent. In this framework, the Agent chooses to work exclusively for one Principal, making the Agent's reservation utility endogenous as it is directly tied to the competin
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