Predictive Processing: Commitments, unifying Mental Functions, and Perceptual Illusions

Predictive Processing (PP) presents a theoretical framework that postulates the brain's primary objective is to minimize prediction errors across hierarchical levels by continuously generating and refining predictions about the external world. Although PP offers valuable insights into the unification of seemingly distinct mental processes, its ambition as a comprehensive theory of mind has also drawn substantial criticism. Debates surrounding PP are frequently hindered by disagreements about what it is. To address this issue, this thesis will first elucidate the theoretical foundations and commitments of PP through the Marr's tri-level analysis. Subsequently, I will reconstruct an argument positioning PP as an overarching theory of perception, imagination, memory, and dreaming. Finally, by examining objections to PP stemming from perceptual illusions, such as the Müller-Lyer Illusion (MLI), I will propose a mature understanding of PP that can both withstand criticism and offer guidance in explaining the diverse functions of the mind.