On the Relation between Epistemic Progress and Moral Progress

Scholars assume the necessity of epistemic progress (EP) for moral progress (MP), where EP involves forming more accurate moral judgments. This is problematic, since we lack the cognitive control necessary to form accurate moral judgments (Klenk & Sauer 2021). Thus, if it is true that EP is necessary for MP, and if it is true that we are naturally bad epistemic agents, then MP is impossible. Here I consider three possible logical relations between EP and MP: (A) EP is necessary and sufficient for MP, (B) EP is necessary but not sufficient for MP, and (C) EP is neither necessary nor sufficient for MP. I argue that (A) cannot account for full MP, while (B) is a promising route if we wish to maintain both the epistemic requirement and the possibility for full MP. Finally, I argue that (C) is the only logical way to dismiss the control requirement. Drawing from Iris Murdoch, I suggest that her account of MP that just is EP is an original as well as a promising way to re-frame the debate in a way that allows to account for our natural lack of cognitive control, without it hindering the possibility of MP.