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Emotion and Desire
This chapter explores the intersection of desire and emotion. It is organized around the question of whether desires should be conceived of as a type of emotion alongside fear, anger, pride, etc. The affirmative case is rooted in the apparent similarities between desires and emotion, including with respect to their phenomenological, intentional, evaluative, and motivational characteristics. The negative case acknowledges these basic similarities but maintains that what is in one instance an essential linkage is in the other merely a causal or contingent one. The chapter wraps up with a discussion of the significance of whether desires are emotions for debates about the taxonomy of the mind, action theory, and ethics.
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