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The Political Economy of Corporate Fraud: A Theory and Empirical Tests.
Guided by a theory governance known as slectrorate theory (Bueno de Mesquita et al,2003), we examine how governance structures within publicly traded companies affects corporate performance, the ease with which corporate executives lose their jobs for poor performance, and the incentives of executi
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