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CEO Compensation and Private Information: An Optimal Contracting Perspective
We consider the joint optimal design of CEOs’ severance pay and on-the-job pay in a model in which the CEO has interim private information about the likely success of his strategy. The board faces a tradeoff between reducing the likelihood that the firm forgoes an efficient strategy change and limi
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