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DESIGN OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE: Role of Ownership Structure, Takeovers, and Bank Debt
We examine how different economies would design an optimal corporate governance system structured from three of the main mechanisms of corporate governance (managerial ownership, monitoring by banks, and disciplining by the takeover market). We allow for interactions among the mechanisms. The firs
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