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Bargaining Over New Ideas: Rent Distribution and Stability of Innovative Firms
We analyze a model of bargaining over new ideas. The model accounts for the problem of information leakage, i.e., the diffusion of information about the idea before and after the idea is implemented. We analyze the effects of information leakage on the distribution of rents within firms and the fi
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