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On the Informed Seller Problem: Optimal Information Disclosure
We consider a revenue-maximizing seller who, before proposing a mechanism to sell her object(s), observes a vector of signals correlated with buyersívaluations. Each buyer knows only the signal that the seller observes about him, but not the signals she observes about other buyers. The seller Örst
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