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Strategic Analysis of Petty Corruption: Entrepreneurs and Bureaucrats
This paper develops a game-theoretic model of petty corruption by government officials. Such corruption is widespread, especially (but not only) in developing and transition economies. The model goes beyond the previously published studies in the way it describes the structure of bureaucratic track
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