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Corporate Governance and Managerial Risk Taking: Theory and Evidence
We study how the investor protection environment affects corporate managers’ incentives to take value-enhancing risks. In our model, the manager chooses higher perk consumption when investor protection is low. Since perks represent a priority claim held by the manager, lower investor protection lead
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