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The Benefits of Franchising and Vertical Disintergration in Monopolistic Competition for Locationally Differentiated Products
A model of franchising competition in locationally differentiated products is constructed. A franchisor (upstream firm) collects a marginal transfer fee per unit of output sold by a franchisee (downstream firm). For example, the marginal transfer fee can be realized as a markup on variable inputs su
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