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The Effect of Leverage on Bidding Behavior: Theory and Evidence from the FCC Auctions
This paper investigates how firm bidding behavior in various auctions is affected by capital structure. A theoretical model is developed where the first price sealed bid and second price sealed bid auctions are examined in situations where the firms are competing for an asset with either a common va
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