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Managerial Entrenchment and Capital Structure Decisions
We study associations between managerial entrenchment and firms’ capital structures, with results generally suggesting that entrenched CEOs seek to avoid debt. In a cross-sectional analysis, we find that leverage levels are lower when CEOs do not face pressure from either ownership and compensation
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