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A Theory of Bank Regulation and Management Compensation
This paper examines the incentive structure underlying the current features of bank regulation. We show that capital regulation has limited effectiveness, given the observed high leverage ratios of banks. We propose instead a more direct and effective mechanism of influencing incentives through the
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