NYU Faculty Digital Archive
metadata only
Scaling the Hierarchy: How and Why Investment Banks Compete for Syndicate Co-Management Appointments
We investigate the empirical puzzle why banks pressured their analysts to provide aggressive assessments of issuing firms during the 1990s when doing so apparently had little positive effect on their chances of receiving lead-management appointments and ultimately led to regulatory penalties and co
Conceptio Open Archive
Analyze & explore related research in Conceptio
Connect this record directly into your research workflow or AI agent. Explore citations across open repositories, query full text, and export structured proof bundles.
This document is indexed with metadata only: full text is not available in the archive for this record. Open the official source ↗
Related documents
- CENTRAL BANK ENGAGEMENT AND REGULATORY REFORMS IN STRENGTHENING FINANCIAL SYSTEMS#237796
- AN ANALYSIS AND CRITIQUE OF THE BIS PROPOSAL ON CAPITAL ADEQUACY AND RATINGS#942660
- Coordination verticale dans l'industrie avicole : Une perspective institutionnelle#268795
- Who You Know Matters: Venture Capital Networks and Investment Performance#942449
- The relationship between board characteristics and firm performance in Malaysian public listed companies#1025101
Record · ID 942437
Retrieved via Conceptio: every document is proof-bundled with source, license, and retrieval metadata.
Retrieved via Conceptio: every document is proof-bundled with source, license, and retrieval metadata.
Bring this data into your agent: Connect via MCP or API · 20 free credits to start · no card required
Read the Docs → · View CLI source on GitHub · Conceptio Open Knowledge Archive
Read the Docs → · View CLI source on GitHub · Conceptio Open Knowledge Archive