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A Theory of Bank Regulation and Management Compensation
This paper examines the incentive structure underlying the current features of bank regulation, particularly the role of prompt corrective action, capital requirements and mandatory restrictions on asset choice as primary tools to control risk-shifting incentives of depository institutions. We show
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