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Understanding Fee Structures in the Asset Management Business
This paper considers the economic role of fees in aligning the incentives of money managers with those of investors. We examine a simple model in which manager effort (or investment in human and physical capital) is observed by the investor prior to her investment decision, but is not verifiable. Th
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