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Conflicts of interest and efficient contracting in IPOs
We study the role of underwriter compensation in mitigating conflicts of interest between companies going public and their investment bankers. Making the bank’s compensation more sensitive to the issuer’s valuation should reduce agency conflicts and thus underpricing. Consistent with this prediction
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