NYU Faculty Digital Archive
metadata only
Contingent Control Rights and Managerial Incentives: The Design of Long-term Debt
Enterprises, small or large, rely heavily on long-term financing arrangements to fund their operations. However, it has proved difficult for financial theory to justify the use of long-term contracts when the manager has the ability to divert or manipulate the cash flows, and when it is prohibitivel
Conceptio Open Archive
Analyze & explore related research in Conceptio
Connect this record directly into your research workflow or AI agent. Explore citations across open repositories, query full text, and export structured proof bundles.
This document is indexed with metadata only: full text is not available in the archive for this record. Open the official source ↗
Related documents
- New directions in management accounting and control – Empirical evidence on the impact of contemporary circumstances and corporate responses / Marvin Kalla#1052412
- Firms’ human rights practices: impacts on firms’ ESG and financial performance#398518
- Portfolio Performance and Agency#942679
- The Human Rights Obligations of Corporate Directors#1174760
- Privately Negotiated Withdrawals: How Shareholders Can Shape a Company's Carbon Emissions Reduction#268217
Record · ID 942635
Retrieved via Conceptio: every document is proof-bundled with source, license, and retrieval metadata.
Retrieved via Conceptio: every document is proof-bundled with source, license, and retrieval metadata.
Bring this data into your agent: Connect via MCP or API · 20 free credits to start · no card required
Read the Docs → · View CLI source on GitHub · Conceptio Open Knowledge Archive
Read the Docs → · View CLI source on GitHub · Conceptio Open Knowledge Archive