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Companies' Modest Claims About the Value of CEO Stock Option Awards
This paper analyzes companies' disclosure of CEO stock option values in compliance with recent changes in the SEC’s regulations for reporting executive compensation data to stockholders. Results suggest that companies exploit the flexibility of the SEC’s disclosure regulations to reduce the apparent
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