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Do Corporations Award CEO Stock Options Effectively
This paper analyzes stock option wards to CEOs of 792 U.S. public corporations between 1984 and 1991. Using a Black-Scholes approach, I test whether stock options’ performance incentives have significant associations with explanatory variables related to agency cost reduction. Further tests examine
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