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Corporate Governance Objectives of Labor Union Shareholders: Evidence from Proxy Voting
Labor union shareholders have become increasingly vocal in matters of corporate governance, however, their motives have been subject to much debate in the academic literature and business press. I examine the proxy votes of AFL-CIO pension funds in director elections of 504 companies from 2003 to 20
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