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Corporate Governance, Product Market Competition, and Equity Prices
This paper examines the hypothesis that firms in competitive industries should benefit relatively less from good governance, while firms in non-competitive industries–where lack of competitive pressure fails to enforce discipline on managers–should benefit relatively more. Whether we look at the
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