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Tractability and Detail-Neutrality in Incentive Contracting
This paper identifies a broad class of situations in which the contract is both attainable in closed form and "detail-neutral". The contract's functional form is independent of the noise distribution and reservation utility; moreover, when the cost of effort is pecuniary, the contract is linear in
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