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Informational Hold-up and Performance Persistence in Venture Capital
We propose and test a theory of learning and informational hold-up in the venture capital market. The model predicts that higher returns on the current fund increase the probability that a VC will raise a follow-on fund, the size of the follow-on fund, and the performance fee investors are charged
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