Explanatory Compression and the Structural Convergence of God and Science

This paper investigates the long-standing philosophical concept of a unique necessary existent, traditionally denoted as God, by subjecting it to a sequence of explanatory admissibility constraints: operational definability, epistemic accessibility, causal intelligibility, and structural coherence. Rather than presupposing any specific ontological framework (such as physicalism), the argument proceeds from a minimal epistemic premise: all inquiry occurs from within some concrete system of representation and interaction, and all meaningful explanatory claims must be evaluable from such a standpoint. Under iterative application of these constraints, traditional metaphysical attributes associated with God—such as transcendence, external grounding, and explanatory priority over the totality—are shown to lose their explanatory function. The concept of an ultimate ground does not disappear, but instead converges toward a fixed point: the total self-consistent structure within which inquiry itself is possible. In this limit, “God” and “Science” are revealed not as competing explanations, but as historically distinct names for the same structural boundary of explanation. The classical notion of a metaphysically external necessary being is replaced by a conception of internal structural necessity, and the demand for an explanation of the totality is shown to be conceptually ill-formed.