Theistic Frameworks, the Evil Genius, and Real Skeptical Doubt

In her exposition of Wittgenstein’s On Certainty, Danièle Moyal-Sharrock (2004) elaborates on Wittgenstein’s conception of certainty and doubt to argue that Cartesian skeptical doubt involving the evil genius is not a real doubt, does not influence our practices and actions, and it is a category mistake. This paper will argue that if we take Descartes in his historical context, we will realize that Cartesian doubt qualifies the conditions Moyal-Sharrock sets for genuine cases of doubt. In general, within specific theistic frameworks, such doubts are possible and pass the test of genuine doubt proposed by Moyal-Sharrock. Although such doubts are not genuine within the Wittgensteinian framework, this should not lead to the conclusion that Wittgensteinian arguments and considerations about genuine doubts are valid in all frameworks. This paper concludes that taking the Wittgensteinian idea of framework seriously leads to the conclusion that meaningful and genuine skeptical doubts are framework-dependent.