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Leontius, Odysseus, and self-reproach
In Plato’s Republic, Socrates’ account of a soul with more than one part or power provides ways of accounting for interesting self-directed or reflexive reactive attitudes, including ‘self-reproach’, the analysis of which is otherwise not at all straightforward. Thinking about these attitudes reveals some fundamental characteristics of how Socrates imagines the relationships between the parts of the soul. This is illustrated by looking again at two very familiar passages: the discussions in Republic 4 of the cases of Leontius and Odysseus (439d5–441c3).
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