„Objektive Realität“ und „objektive Gültigkeit“: Vor- und nach-anschauliche Objektivität bei Kant

Throughout his philosophy, Kant relies on the crucial concepts of “objective validity” and “objective reality,” pivotal in arguments such as the “Transcendental Deduction of the Categories” and the “Refutation of Idealism” in his Critique of Pure Reason. However, the lack of desired clarity in Kant’s usage impedes scholarly progress. Despite their significance, “objective validity” and “objective reality” have not received sufficient attention in secondary literature. Consensus on whether they represent the same idea remains elusive, and even among those recognizing them as distinct concepts, disagreement persists regarding their precise meanings. In this paper, I show that these concepts are distinct. I argue that a concept is objectively valid when our right or entitlement to apply it to objects is established independently and prior to any intuition. Conversely, a concept is objectively real when presented to us in intuition, either in pure intuition, as seen in geometrical figures, or in empirical intuition, as evident in material objects. This interpretation, however, falls short of fully elucidating Kant’s use of these terms due to his lack of systematicity in their application across concepts, intuitions, objects, cognitions, representations, synthesis, and even ideas, God, and purposiveness. Consequently, while shedding light on many instances, this interpretation encounters limits.