Koc University Digital Collections
metadata only
Strategic effects of renegotiation-proof contracts
It is well known that non-renegotiable contracts with third parties may have an effect on the outcome of a strategic interaction and thus serve as a commitment device. We address this issue when contracts are renegotiable. More precisely, we analyze the equilibrium outcomes of two-stage games with r
Conceptio Open Archive
Analyze & explore related research in Conceptio
Connect this record directly into your research workflow or AI agent. Explore citations across open repositories, query full text, and export structured proof bundles.
This document is indexed with metadata only: full text is not available in the archive for this record. Open the official source ↗
Related documents
- Costly Contracting in a Long-Term Relationship#942213
- Prevention and promotion approaches to contracting: Implications for negotiator focus and contract frames on exchange performance and relationships in the digital age#675918
- The Strategic Structure of Offer and Acceptance: Game Theory and the Law of Contract Formation#270077
- Auctions with Contract Design#1118652
- Large-Market Discipline in Combinatorial Double Auctions: No Assembly, Bundle Selection, and Complementarities#615150
Record · ID 954590
Retrieved via Conceptio: every document is proof-bundled with source, license, and retrieval metadata.
Retrieved via Conceptio: every document is proof-bundled with source, license, and retrieval metadata.
Bring this data into your agent: Connect via MCP or API · 20 free credits to start · no card required
Read the Docs → · View CLI source on GitHub · Conceptio Open Knowledge Archive
Read the Docs → · View CLI source on GitHub · Conceptio Open Knowledge Archive