The Notion of a Self-Conscious Genus-Process: Hegel’s Concept of the Family

In this text, I interpret Hegel’s concept of the family within the context of his theory of freedom. I take family life to entail a certain tension between freedom and nature that makes it necessary to reflect on the role of nature in our understanding of the family. For this, I examine two ways of understanding the family’s relation to nature, a conser- vative and a liberal one, to then offer a third, dialectical way as an alternative. My central argument is that Hegel’s concept of the family can be read as a response to the problem of our entanglement with nature and is thereby an integral part of his theory of ethical life and freedom. For this, I outline the normative principle underlying Hegel’s family concept that I will call ‘the notion of a self-conscious genus-process’ (Gattungsprozess). This notion enables an immanent critique of Hegel’s concept of the family without abandoning his dialectical conception of the relationship between freedom and nature.