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Understanding the Privacy-Preserving Potential of HTTP/2 Against Webpage Fingerprinting
Website fingerprinting (WF) attacks can infer which webpage a user visits from encrypted HTTPS traffic alone, compromising privacy even without decryption. WF defenses commonly shape traffic through noise, padding, delays, or flow splitting, yet they are most often studied from the perspective of en
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